ON FLOATING IDEAS AND THE IMAGINAEY. 467 Play is not in principle excluded, we have seen, from any aspect of life. And when we come to mere amusements which exist for the sake of playing, they tend, as we have seen, to develop a character, too often perverted, of work and earnest. There is in short no natural separation of life into spheres of necessary work and of mere play. And, when we con- sider these extremes, we find that, differing otherwise, they share the same essential feature. Neither has its end in itself, neither contributes, individually and in itself, a special element to human value. Each on the contrary is desirable solely for the sake of an effect, particular or general, which it produces. The division of human existence into spheres of necessary work and of optional play leads therefore, when developed, to confusion and absurdity. The world of play turns out to be the only world which a man could seriously desire, and the world of earnest, when you examine it, proves to be that which by itself has no importance or value. Every- thing which possesses human interest becomes mere play, while the residue could be an end only for irrational caprice. Any such view breaks down at once when confronted with the facts of actual life. Thus a stage-play, to take that instance, is even to the spectator not mere playing, while to the actor it is the serious business of life. It is not merely the work by which he lives, but it is the main end of his being, the special function by which he at once contributes to humanity and realises himself. On the other side the necessity of living is no real necessity, unless the life, which in oneself or others it subserves, is really desirable. A mere inhuman subsistence and an empty practice are (I would repeat) things which, except through an illusion, no one could take in earnest. Play, we have thus seen, is one aspect of life. It is, or in principle it may be, everywhere present. The division of life into spheres of work and play may be most important and even necessary, but any such division after all is not absolute but relative. If you take it otherwise it becomes an error which even practically may have bad results, and which theoretically cannot fail to be more or less injurious. It is parallel to the separation of the world into real and imagin- ary, matter of fact and mere ideas. And it proves, when we consider it, to be another offshoot of the same fundamental error. It will, I think, tend further to illustrate the same be necessary to the satisfaction of a want, so far is not mere playing. But of course the detail of play is seldom felt to be thus necessary, and obviously the feeling tends, if the activity lasts, to disappear.
