PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF IDEAS. 525 belong to ' timeless existence "... but because they belong wholly to the world of becoming ". Here again it is neglect of psychology not, this time, of the psychology of the scientific faculty, but of the psychology of aesthetic and religious experience, which causes Prof. Burnet to fall, as it seems to me, into serious error. Regarded as belonging to the world of ' timeless existence ' that is, as objects of Contemplation for the subject of aesthetic and religious experience the ' Ideas ' cannot be otherwise described than in myth, any more than Soul, World and God can be otherwise described. On the other hand, regarded as the concepts-in-use by which the Man of Science makes sensibilia intelligible to himself and others, they cannot, without some exaggeration of language, be said to belong to the world of ' timeless existence ' at all. They are merely explana- tions explanations which are always found to be true of things occurring in this temporal world this world which, although it may be described mythically TraiSias ev/ca, is certainly object of scientific knowledge indeed the only object. It is when we go beyond this sensible world with its occurrences in time which our conceptual instruments enable us to explain scientifically, and begin to ponder ' things eternal, ' that myth begins to be taken up, not TraiSias ere^a, or in any spirit of 'parody,' but in earnest. "Soul, World and God are the proper subjects of myth . . . not because they belong to timeless existence, but because they belong wholly to the world of becoming." On the contrary it is just because Soul, World and God are ' things eternal ' not things temporal to be explained by scientific categories that they must, if set forth at all, be set forth in myth. Instead of saying, 'They are subjects of myth because they are temporal, ' we ought to say, ' They are set forth as temporal when they are made subjects of Discourse '. In their case the Discourse is necessarily mythical because it cannot be scientific, not dealing with the occurrences of this sensible world which alone admit of scientific explanation. Prof. Burnet seems to me to take the meaning of the Timceus quite wrongly when he maintains that Soul, Cosmos and God really belong are not merely represented in Discourse as belonging to the w r orld of becoming. 3. "The Good is known by Intellect alone." Of course this doctrine, attributed by Prof. Bumet to Plato, on the authority of such phrases as fte'yio-rov p.d6r)fj.a,s not true. Modern Psychology, I take it, endorses Spinoza's "We do not seek a thing because we think that it is good, but we think that it is good because we seek it." The psychic state answering to the ultimate Good is not 'knowledge,' but the ultimate ' value- feeling ' which consists in the massive satisfaction which the given Organism Human Nature or any other experiences in living its own Life the satisfaction of the given Organism with the environment suitable to its Type. Plainly the suitability must exist before the feeling of satisfaction can arise. The ' Vegetative Soul ' (which, by-the-bye, Prof. Burnet, in his reference to Timceus, 71 A-E, equates with the 'Sensitive 35
