HAROLD H. JOACHIM, The Nature of Truth. 549 the essence of truth ' (p. 20). : It is clear that ' truth ' is here used in two senses : (1) for the relation (' correspondence ') of thought to reality ; (2) for reality itself, i.e., for one of the factors in that rela- tion. And this, plainly, makes nonsense. No solution of the .problem of truth is possible as long as the word is used in two con- tradictory senses. However, it may be said, that this is largely a question of words. If we put ' independent reality ' for ' independent truth,' what fault have we to find with the doctrine ? Is it not true, that reality is ' independent ' in the sense of being ' discovered, and not invented ' ? And must not truth be found in some sort of relation between our knowledge and this reality ? This conception of the independence of the object of knowledge contains the most troublesome problem that the enquirer into the nature of truth has to face. For it is easy to put such a sense upon it, that the independence of reality comes into open conflict with its ^relation to our knowledge. It seems a plain contradiction to say -that reality is knowable and yet unaffected by knowledge ; and Mr. Joachim has an easy task in exposing the fallacy that ' experiencing makes no difference to the facts ' (pp. 39 ff.). And yet, however triumphant Mr. Joachim's dialectics may be, one cannot help feeling that he has gained a somewhat barren victory. One may agree that independence in the above sense is untenable, but independence in some sense exists. That conviction remains un- shaken. An inadequate formulation of it has been destroyed, but its real nerve has not been cut. The problem would be to discover the sense of independence which is tenable. And it may be said that, after all, the results of Mr Joachim's examination of the ' coherence-notion ' (to which he himself inclines as, at least, more .adequate than any other) bear witness to the ' independence ' of reality. For is he not forced to acknowledge : " Still ' the scientific mind ' is over against a reality to be known, and its ' concrete thinking' is about something other than the thought" (p. 116) ? 2 And does he not revive the doctrine of Mr. Bradley's Logic, that the content of thought is adjectival, divorced from substantial reality ? Absolute independence may be contradicted by the fact of knowledge, but relative independence there must be ; and if we could but succeed in defining it, we might hope to get a step nearer to the solution of the problem. ' The facts are unalterable and given. They control our Science.' That is a common way of expressing the independence of reality. And the familiar reply, of course, is that the distinction off fact and theory is futile, and that ' the Science includes all relevant facts '. For we cannot know what the facts really are until we know all 1 The confusion is not due to Mr. Joachiui who in the passage quoted Is merely reporting a 'familiar distinction '. Besides, his own remarks on pp. 68-69 implicitly condemn the confusion. 2 Italics by Mr. Joachim. This remark applies to all quotations, un- less otherwise stated.
