HAEOLD H. JOACHIM, The Nature of Truth. 553 ; through its determined efforts. The adjustment of new and old in such a case, the process of verification without an analysis of which, by the way, it is impossible to do justice to the function of sense-perception in knowledge the direct contact of the mind with reality, would have thrown a fresh and vivid light on the many good things that Mr. Joachim has to say on the place of" ' apperceptive character' (pp. 93 ff.) and systematic coherence in- knowledge. It is just at the fringes of knowledge where truth is- in the making, that both the union of knowledge and reality and the danger of their divergence are most vividly realised, and most fruitfully studied. Besides, if Mr. Joachim had paid more attention to this aspect of the problem, some kindred questions, now not touched upon, would probably have found mention. For instance, the non- cognitive kinds of experience and their relation to cognition present some problems which it would be profitable to discuss and which are overmuch neglected ; e.g., dreams, creations of the imagination, etc., resemble cognitive experiences in that they are qualifications of the subject's existence (his experiences), whilst they also possess- content or have objects. Yet they are not embodied in the struc- ture of what we commonly called the ' real ' world. They are treated as having no cognitive value at all ; and the fact that they are neither ' true ' nor ' false ' distinguishes them from errors, i.e., from experiences claiming cognitive value without possessing it. The principle on which we distinguish those experiences that be- long to knowledge from those that do not is not easy to find. And, in any case, what would be the relation of these non- cognitive experiences to the ideal experience which Mr. Joachim-. postulates as an implication of human cognition ? It seems almost unfair to suggest additional problems where Mr. Joachim has given us so much that is stimulating and instructive. Would that philosophers enjoyed a poet's licence of solving alT difficulties with the magic of an inspired phrase. Then they might avail themselves of Goethe's magnificent phrase : ' Phantasie fur die Wahrheit des Wirklichen ' which joins all jarring elements- in harmony and peace. As it is, they must labour by intellectual effort to beat out a satisfactory theory. Towards that end Mr. Joachim's book will be a valuable help, ' clearing the mind of much sham knowledge, ' and awakening fresh reflexion on problems to which we are but too apt to apply the maxim about ' letting- sleeping dogs lie'. K. F. ALFRED HOERNLE. NOTE. For a further criticism of Mr. Joachim's work see Dis- cussion by Mr. Eussell in the current number of MIND (p. 528). EDITOB.
