TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES. 85 desire ; the question, ' What desire ? ' seems at least a pertinent ona) If Mr. Schiller would reflect a little on this point, I think he would begin to see why some of us believe that the practical con- sequences of the wholesale application of his principle to conduct would be morally unfortunate. Let me illustrate what I mean, in the right Socratic fashion, by considering the working of the principle in a simple case, one of a kind which I know to be not uncommon. I am, we will suppose, a doctor with a family to support in a country town where there are a number of well-to-do malades imaginaires. If I humour these persons cleverly, listening with sympathy to their narratives, and hinting constantly that they really are ill and delicate, they will become permanent paying patients, and my legitimate human interest in making an income will be forwarded. If I tell them they have no disease but idleness and selfishness, they will go off to my rivals, and the interest in making an income will be thwarted. Hence, if Mr. Schiller's doctrine is to be accepted as it stands, it seems we must say, The first of the two statements here suggested is true and good, the second false and bad. But will any " over- zealous controversialist" really say this? Or, if he does, is he entitled to bewail the " strange narrowness " of his critics, or to talk of ' painful revelations ' when they describe his views as lead- ing to sordid results ? 1 Again, can he reasonably complain, if in view of these singular logical consequences of his principle, his curious qualifying phrase ' pro tanto true ' is suspected of being designed in case of need to cover an escape by the back-door from an untenable position ? If Mr. Schiller would reflect seriously on some of these inferences from his doctrine, he would, I think, cease to find it so inexplicable a mystery that the doctrine of himself and Prof. James has not given universal satisfaction. And I do not think the gain in appre- ciation of his opponent's meaning would be too dearly purchased by the sacrifice of some part of his stock of pious " indignation ". Mr. Schiller s second reference to myself may be dismissed much more briefly. It occurs on page 238 where I am once more rebuked for a " tendency to suppose " that " what I imagine to be a ' dis- interested ' interest in ' pure ' thought, and ' useless ' knowledge, and a (presumably unreciprocated) affection for Absolutes are somehow not to be counted as cases of emotional interest ". I am not aware 1 1 could wish, to take a more important example, that Pragmatism would explicitly declare whether it does or does not countenance the principle of Pascal's famous "wager". Prof. James (Will to Believe, pp. 5-7) appears to reject the principle on the ground that he personally does not think the existence of Pascal's deity credible. But the real problem is whether, if a man thinks there is one chance in ten million of the existence of such an almighty fiend, there ceases to be any moral turpitude in his safeguarding his ' eternal interests ' by conformity. On this point I should like to express my absolute agreement with Mr. Benn's attitude in his recent essay on the " wager " (International Journal of Ethics, April, 1905).
