H. STEINTHAI/S ABRISS L>ER SPRACHWISSESSCHAFT, I. 149 the special is apperceived by the more general, the percept by the concept, the species by the genus. As regards the sciences we may say that the identifying apperception applies to geography and astronomy, and to botany and zoology, in so far as it is a question of recognising species. On the other hand, mathematics, comparative anatomy, and the science of language may be looked upon as subsumptive apperceptions. The third form is what is known as the harmonising apperception. That is to say, the various spheres of apperception stand to each other in an external relationship such as antithesis or indifference. For instance, some one has sustained a heavy loss : a beloved one has died ; he says: I cannot yet grasp it, i.e., apperceive it. He can most certainly subsume it, but cannot harmonise it with his emotion ; he is still full of feelings, memories, thoughts, plans, wishes, which pre-suppose the life of the dear deceased. Lastly, we have the i-i-'-atit.-c- apperception, in which the apperceiving momentum itself is first created. To this order belong guessing, supposing, imagining, &c. Of these kinds of apperception enumerated by Steinthal, it is remarked by Benno Erdmann, first of all, that they are defined according to the scheme of formal logic, whereas psychological considerations should alone have sufficed ; and, secondly, that in consequence a really peculiar kind of apperception from a psycho- logical point of view, which he calls the determining apperception, has been overlooked. Steinthal says that he certainly had looked to logic for the more immediate qualification of the kinds, as was clearly manifest from his using the word ' subsumptive,' but it was only after a purely concrete search he had done so. He would now suggest the following as the psychological background. The identifying apperception would rest upon amalgamation, but the subsumptive upon complication or concatenation ; on the other hand, the harmonising would be based upon the harmony of the object to be apperceived with the dominant group of pre- sentations under which it must be brought. As regards the drtermining apperception it can only be co- ordinated to Steinthal's species in the sense of forming a genus by itself. For Steinthal's species of apperception are forms of coi/nitiott, whilst the determining apperception is what we generally call unili>r*t'iniling. And just as cognition has its kinds or forms of apperception, so also has understanding. The determining apperception is not a simple one, but embraces differences, that is to say, the species of interpretation : the grammatical, real, stylistic, historical and individual. But criticism, the last and psychological form of interpretation, rests upon the harmonising apperception, i.e., upon that of cognition. Now, the science of language, though a mental science, adopts the method of the natural sciences, namely, the inductive and deductive method, which, psychologically, rests upon the sub- sumptive and creative apperceptions. Entirely opposed to this
