332 CHARLES MERCIER: externally, as to present a strong primd facie claim for con- sideration. Now, what is the most fundamental division that can be made among interactions in general, as occurring between two agents ? Manifestly that according to the way they are begun. Such an action may be begun by one agent, or by the other, or by both together ; and manifestly the way in which it was begun will affect and modify the whole of the remainder of the action. An interaction between the organ- ism and the environment may be initiated by the environ- ment, or by the organism, or simultaneously by both, and the corresponding feelings will fall naturally into three great orders. Feelings of the first order have their root in the sensation of Touch, and its extension Pressure, which corre- sponds with the most fundamental action of the environ- ment on the organism the action of mechanical contact. Feelings of the second order have their root in the sensation of Effort, which corresponds with muscular movement the fundamental form of all actions of the organism on the environment. Feelings of the third order have their root in Resistance, which is manifestly a combination of the other two. While therefore this feeling, as it partakes of the nature of the other two, approaches nearer to both of them than either of them does to the other, yet, inasmuch as it is compound, it differs more widely from them both than they do from each other. What is the nature of this difference ? A feeling of Touch and a feeling of Effort do not necessarily combine into a feeling of Resistance when experienced together, as may be seen when the touch refers to one part of the organism and the effort to another. What then is it that the sensation of Resistance corresponds with ? It is the relation that the two factors in the interaction bear to one another the relation of the muscular strain to the pressure, or in subjective terms, the sensation of Resistance is the relation of the sensation of Effort to that of Touch or Pressure. But a relation between two feelings is a cogni- tion. Ought we not then to speak of Resistance not as a feeling but as a cognition, seeing that it is a relation between feelings, and corresponds with a relation that of co-existence between extension and body in the environment ? Whether we so regard it depends entirely upon the aspect from which we look at it. Undoubtedly the state of mind called Resist- ance is a relation between two feelings, and is therefore, from one aspect, a cognition ; but, as Mr. Spencer points out with great clearness, a relation between feelings is itself a kind of feeling the momentary feeling accompanying the
