364 EDMUND MONTGOMEEY : and with which all our developing faculties keep equal pace from the beginning to the end of our planetary existence. Transcendentalists themselves instinctively shrink from these necessary consequences of their position. They are anxious to compromise in some way with natural science. But this is a matter of most momentous import ; a matter in which the highest interests of humanity are immediately concerned. Spiritual Kecognitioii or Natural Development '? Either the human body in its progressive organisation has to be cherished as the only true temple and revealing oracle in the universe ; or complete extrication from every bodily impediment, through adequate recognition, must become the chief aim of human exertion. Where can there be found in human history a conflict that does not dwindle into insigni- ficance in comparison with this one now pending ? In such a vital cause, conscious or unconscious prevarication must prove intensely prejudicial to all concerned. Thorough can- dour is most desirable ; for we all wish unambiguously to learn what our existence really implies. Let Transcen- dentalists then fearlessly think out their own system, and not believe themselves rooted in real knowledge, because some glimpses of truth have enabled them to carry on an effective warfare against other prevalent interpretations of nature. The late Professor Green, by his valiant fight against Nominalistic Idealism, has gained knightly honours among philosophers. He has clearly shown that no feeling and thinking subject can possibly originate from the coalescence of mental phenomena ; that the power which combines such phenomena must pre-exist in every phenomenal experience ; that, in fact, the mental states are not themselves our veri- table being. But, as regards the necessary conclusions of his own system, this resolute assailant betrays a strangely un- steady grasp. He, like other Transcendentalists, labours to prove that the thinking principle in us originates objective reality, by the recognition of facts eternally abiding in a universal consciousness. He does not admit sensorial com- pulsion, or the Kantian distinction between "form" and "matter" of thought. To him our consciousness is a syn- thetised product, entirely the work of the thinking entity. Thus bravely does he follow the lead of his first principles, whilst considering the composition of consciousness in general. But, when he attempts to account for our gradu- ally becoming what we are, his transcendental courage fails him. He evidently does not see his way as he ought in conformity with his general view to maintain that
