498 EDMUND GUENEY nosis bringing with it the former special excitatory conditions. But other phenomena seem quite beyond the legitimate scope of such a theory. If the ' subject ' is brought into the ' alert state,' made to go through the ordinary platform buffooneries, and then reawakened, there is often not any breach of consciousness at all ; and he gives a description, which there is not the slightest ground for calling in ques- tion, of his state of mind in performing the actions as, (.//., that he felt disinclined to do them but could not help it, or that he was aware of their absurdity but could see no reason for not doing them. Again, on re-hypnotisatiou the events of the previous hypnotic state are sometimes spoken of with fulness, in answer to perfectly neutral questions ; nor do they merely recur in unrelated sequence, as by the release of particular springs, but are compared and estimated. There is here 110 mere rejoining of a temporarily-broken associative chain : the phrases used are to all appearance the normal results of a discursive and critical review of past experiences ; and the onus probandi rests with those who deny that what gives every sign of being genuine memory is genuine memory. When once this hypnotic memory is duly recognised, the study of its varieties will be found of great interest ; and in a recent paper (in MIND XXXIII.), I endeavoured to make this study the basis of a clear separa- tion between two states the ' alert ' and the ' deep ' that have commonly been distinguished merely as steps in a single process, continuous stages on the path to hypnotic sleep. The results there given have an important bearing on the central question as to the respective relations of conscious- ness and of reflex action to the hypnotic state, or rather states. Under appropriate conditions, we saw reason to recognise true subsequent memory, and therefore present consciousness, even in the lighter stages of what I called the ' deep ' state ; and when we passed upwards to the lower phenomena of the ' alert ' state e.g., mimicry, and me- chanical obedience we could often appeal further to the absolute unbrokenness of the conscious stream. Where memory is absent, and where there is a distinct breach in the train of consciousness, arguments may still be drawn from experiments such as the one on hearing above re- counted, where a point is left to the ' subject's ' decision, and the truth of this decision is independently ascertained. Again, the end being suggested, the ' subject ' will take his own means to accomplish it. He will use his reasoning powers as in the case of Dr. Hack Tuke's ' subject ' who was
