LIFE AND MECHANISM. 45 even in circumstances which had not previously been ex- perienced by the organism or its ancestors, we may infer that the action is purposive, and that therefore objects perceived are perceived purposively. From this may be drawn conclusions similar to those drawn from the con- sideration of purposive actions in the case of the earthworm and other cases. 1 Attention conditions not only the fact of perception, but also the nature of that which is perceived. To two men, especially if they are of altogether different tastes, the same phenomenon will seem altogether different, although both of them attend to it most carefully, and form a distinct conception of it. That which a thing perceived is for the perceiving organism, it is as manifesting in itself the life of the organism, just as any one of the organs has its being as a manifestation of this same life. Thus it is that a man's whole self can be truly said to be expressed in his perception or non-perception of a few bars of music, or a few lines of poetry. It is not sufficient to say that his mind reacts on them just as much as they affect him ; for this implies that there is something in them that is foreign to him, which is not the case. They have just as little independent signifi- cance in their details as they have considered as wholes. In all that they are for him they are determined through and through as taking part in his life ; so that in perceiving them he may be truly said to be perceiving nothing but himself. This is of course only in accordance with the conception previously reached of the surroundings of an organism as participating in its life just as really, though not so intimately, as do its own parts. We are thus enabled to see how it is that separation in time and space is only real in a world looked at abstractly under the category of cause and effect, but becomes altogether unreal when we penetrate behind this abstractness. Nothing less than the unreality of such separation is implied in the doctrine that the bodily parts 1 To attend effectually to an object of perception is often a simple ' voluntary ' act. That is to say, any passing interest is sufficient to direct attention on the object. Frequently, however, far more is required than a mere passing interest ; so that it may be quite impossible voluntarily to give the necessary attention. For example, some persons who are familiar with the Prelude to ' Lohengrin ' profess to see in it little more than " a study of orchestral effects " ; and it may be that no amount of voluntary study of the music will enable them to perceive it as it ought to be per- ceived. Something deeper than a passing interest is necessary. Even in our ordinary perceptions it is only in appearance that a passing interest is sufficient to direct attention, in this wide sense, on the object. This becomes evident if the perceptions of a civilised man be compared with corresponding ones in a savage, or one of the lower animals.
