560 W. L. DAVIDSON : marked, being clearly enough ascertained ; and unless this general territory be definitely recognised and strictly guarded, neither clearness nor progress can be looked for or demanded. in. Up to this point we have considered the Separation of Ques- tions as a logical operation having for its end two distinct things, viz., propriety of exposition and security against irrelevant criti- cisms. But there are certain problems that stand by themselves, and ought to be kept distinct, for a further reason. These deal with the Ultimate, and, being ultimate, are simply not to be dis- cussed, but to be started from. A due regard to this fact would have spared us many a dreary page and many a weary hour. The ultimate, however, has two senses. It is either that which is absolutely fundamental, or that which is fundamental only for the particular science or department under consideration. The absolutely fundamental is that beyond which we cannot get, and which (whether we be dealing with philosophy itself or with a special department of it) when we try to reduce it, lands us in contradictions or in vacuity. The relatively fundamental is seen when the ground-principles of one department find their justifi- cation in another ; as when Logic reposes on Psychology, or Psychology points back to Metaphysics. Examples of the first alone need here be given. We commence with the doctrine of Eelativity (in its sense of Correlativity a ) , and we find that this is absolutely fundamental. All conscious experiences implicate a change of state ; discrimina- tion is indispensable. But discrimination supposes agreement ; without similarity there could be no idea of difference. This then is something that we must simply begin with. When, therefore, we go further and inquire, Which of the two, at the first start of consciousness, is prior in the order of time ? in other words, Does similarity precede difference or difference come before similarity ? we ask a question that from the very nature of the case admits of no solution. In the primary consciousness, according to any idea of consciousness that we are able to form, the two elements are found conjoined; and the conjunction is the point of departure for psychological reasoning. Not greatly different is the question, What would our concep- tion of colour be, supposing the primary colours had been other than they are ? We have indeed room for speculation here, but we need never expect a definite or solid result. Our experiences are such and such, whether we will or not ; and it is quite hopeless to try to get beyond experience. As we cannot stand upon our own shoulders, it is mere waste of time to speculate on what the 1 The other sense, of course, is the finiteness or limitation of the human faculties.
