V. CEITICAL NOTICES. MetapTiysica Nova et Vetusta. A Return to Dualism by SCOTUS NOVANTICUS. London and Edinburgh : Williams & Norgate, 1884. Pp. 182. By calling his work " A Eeturn to Dualism," the writer of this book evidently wishes to express his adhesion, so far, to the national tradition of Scotch philosophy. But though he con- sistently maintains an actual dualism as given in perception, this can hardly be considered the central position of the book ; and indeed there is comparatively little space devoted to the formal proof of it. The author also subsequently uses language which implies the abandonment of his Dualism, understood as an ultimate or metaphysical position. The book is, in fact, an analysis of perception, independently undertaken, but with full knowledge of, and reference to, the Kantian investigation. Be- sides rejecting the subjectivity of the Critick of Pure Reason, the author differs from Kant in maintaining that a real content of knowledge is given to us, not only through sense, but also by Eeason as functionally present in perception. Eeason furnishes us, he contends, with "pure percepts " (or, as he afterwards calls them, "dialectic percepts," "synthetic predications a priori") which are "not merely regulative, but constitutive, of the external". The whole is worked out with much sureness of touch and with real philosophical insight. The author's knowledge and use of German thought is flavoured by a certain sturdy Scotch inde- pendence as well as by an infusion of Scotch caution. He has apparently written first of all to satisfy his own need, and only in the second place for publication. The style, therefore, is marked more by straightforwardness than by literary attractive- ness ; and perhaps too much licence has occasionally been taken in the coining of new expressions. But the writer can often be wonderfully vivid and memorable in his way of clinching an argument or of characterising an opponent's view. Altogether, the book makes the impression of having been written by one who has held himself at some distance from the philosophical schools, and who has embodied in his work the results of his mature thought. We need not follow the author in his grading of the different stages of intelligence (from mere reflex action upwards) lest we fall foul of those whom he calls " the biological psychologists ". The matter is, in its nature, not one in which exactitude is pos- sible. It is sufficient to note the distinction he draws between " Attuition" and Perception a distinction which is the founda- tion of most that follows. Attuition is a word employed to denote "mere receptivity more or less reflexly co-ordinated,"
