604 G. H. SCHNEIDEE'S FREUD UND Here the fact that pleasures result from enhanced and pains from impeded vital processes is shown to be a deduction from the laws of Evolution, and is only valid so far as these laws (conditions of race-maintenance) extend. The unequal sensibility of various parts of the organism, the fact that injury to superficial organs is often attended with greater suffering than disease or derangement of central organs, and other mysteries in the psychology of feeling are here cleared up a casual relation between the pleasures and pains and the need of protection or the chance of persistence of the organism being shown to obtain in the several cases. In the second chapter the pessimists, as represented by Schopen- hauer and Hartmann, are briefly brought to book. It having been shown, in ch. i., that Pain is as necessary as Pleasure according to law of Evolution, a few words may be expended on the question of their relative amount. This may be shortly settled by appeal to the first principle. As long as births increase faster than deaths, as long as individuals realise their expectations and nations grow in wealth and power, so long must there be an excess of pleasure ; but when animal species are on the wane, or individuals lag behind in the race of life, or peoples cease to progress, the balance turns the other way. There is, no doubt, truth in this, but, of course, a positive or plm value of existence is not hereby made out ; for, as the processes of decay and death must set in one day, and in the life of the individual have their inevitable turn, the net result is an equation of joy and sorrow for this world as a ivliole. This old duel of Optimism and Pessimism might, however, have been passed by without detriment to the course of our author's inquiry. Ch. iii. resumes the examination of the nature of Pleasure and Pain with a consideration of the ' ' Eelativity of Pleasures and Pains ". Here the author emphasises the point already alluded to, that joy and suffering must be estimated in relation to antecedent feeling as well as the synchronous feelings of others. " Joy is not possible without sorrow." Contrast is essential for the consciousness of either. Hence a perfectly happy world is a psychological impossibility. In ch. v., the relation of Feeling to Action is shortly discussed. The author refers to his previous works Der thierische Wille and Der menschliche Wille for a full discussion of this important sub- ject. We understand his position to be that rational action is not action directly controlled by conscious reason (for that is psychologically impossible) but action governed by feelings be- tween which and the particular action a relation conformable to the interests of the individual or of society is seen to subsist. Feelings qua feelings never mislead, but only feelings which have acquired an abnormal influence owing to one-sided intellectual activity (passions). Misconduct is the result of morbidity rather than the consequence of imperfect knowledge. A natural sequel to this chapter is the following rather lengthy one, on the
