CHAPTER VII
DEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS—THE SEPARABILITY OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS FROM ITS OBJECT—DISCUSSION OF IDEALISM
One last question suggests itself with regard to the consciousness. In what measure is it separable from the object? Do the consciousness and its object form two things or only one?
Under observation these two terms constantly show themselves united. We experience a sensation and have consciousness of it; it is the same fact expressed in two different ways. All facts of our perception thus present themselves, and they are one. But our reason may outstrip our observation. We are able to make a distinction between the two elements being and being perceived. This is not an experimental but an ideological distinction, and an abstraction that language makes easy.
Can we go further, and suppose one of the parts thus analysed capable of existing without the other? Can sensation exist as physical expression, as an object, without being illuminated by the consciousness? Can the consciousness exist without having an object?
