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those circumstances would constitute only one sin. Similarly a purpose persevered in for years not to pay a debt that is owing constitutes only one sin, though, of course, it is more grievous the longer it is entertained.

4. It is a disputed point among theologians whether a sinful act which is directed to many distinct objects is only one or many sins. An example will illustrate the difficulty. If an anarchist throws a bomb into a crowd of people and kills a score of them, does he commit a score of distinct sins of murder which must be mentioned in confession if he goes to confession, or does he commit only one big sin, whose malice indeed equals twenty, but which is adequately confessed by saying, " I killed a number of people by throwing a bomb "? It will not suffice to say, " I committed homicide," for that would mean the taking of one life only, which was not precisely what was done.

In this controverted question it would seem better to distinguish, and say that if the objects were capable of being grouped together and actually were conceived as one object by the mind, there was one act and one sin. If, however, the criminal distinctly thought of the several objects and intended to kill each and all, there will be as many sins as there are distinct objects. A priest who, when starting for a fortnight's holiday, intends to omit his breviary during the whole time, commits one big sin; but if he executes his design, he commits a new sin every day that he neglects his duty, for the Office of each day forms one total object, and the precept of saying the divine Office is virtually multiple, and falls on each and every day.

5. If the means used to commit a sin are themselves evil and of the same species as the sin, and if they can be regarded as parts of one total object, as, for example, immodest talk and touches with a view to fornication, such means need not be distinctly confessed, as we saw above. If, however, the evil means are of a different species from the sinful end, as, for example, lying in order to commit a theft, the evil means are a separate sin, and must be distinctly confessed. If the means used to commit a sin are not in themselves sinful, they need not be confessed, unless the end was not attained, and in that case it will be sufficient to express in general terms in confession the use of means to give effect to a sinful purpose, by saying, for example, " I tried to commit theft," if the intending thief merely entered a house, but failed to effect his design.