to satisfy our appetite, it might be that no room was left for free choice, that we should be necessitated to action. There would be at least some indeliberate motion towards the object, a movement of the will which divines call motus primo-primus. If in such a case the power of deliberation is not altogether smothered, but is exercised, though imperfectly, the movement of the will which follows is called secundo-primus. If the power of deliberation is wholly wanting, the act which follows cannot be sinful, however wrong objectively; if the act is semi- deliberate, however grievously wrong in itself, it will be imputed to the agent only as a more or less serious venial sin. [1]
These principles are of great importance for forming an estimate of the moral guilt of children, of habitual drunkards, of persons long habituated to sins of the flesh, and persons with weak intellect.
It follows from what has been said that previous knowledge of, and deliberation about, the object proposed by the intellect to the will, is necessary to free and moral action, which is defined by divines to be action which proceeds from man's deliberative will. [2]
5. Human acts are by theologians divided into various classes:
(a) Internal acts are performed by the internal powers of the soul; external, by the bodily organs.
(b) Elicited acts are such as proceed immediately from the will and are performed by it alone. They are usually said to be six in number; three having reference to the end, and three others to the means for the attaining of the end. A wish is a simple inclination of the will or an ineffectual desire of an object; an intention is a firm resolve to attain an object by the use of the appropriate means; fruition is a peaceful delight in the possession, real or imagined, of a loved object. The act of selection between various means to an end is called choice; if no alternative is offered by the intellect, acceptance of the means by the will is called consent, though this term is more commonly used of every act of acceptance by the will of an object proposed to it; use or execution is said of the act of the will which applies the means chosen to the obtaining of the end proposed.
Commanded acts are executed by other faculties than the will by which they are commanded.
