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Page:Moraltheology.djvu/270

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DIVISION III

On Restitution

CHAPTER I

ON RESTITUTION IN GENERAL

WHEN other sins have been committed they are blotted out and reparation as far as possible is made for them by sincere sorrow and repentance. But when commutative justice has been violated it is not sufficient to be sorry for the injustice done; reparation must be made for it by putting, as far as possible, the person injured in the same condition as he would have been if the injury had never been inflicted. This reparation for an injury that has been done to another is called restitution. There is a strict obligation in justice to make restitution as far as is possible to another whom one has injured; for justice requires that each one should have his own; but one who has been injured is deprived of his own so long as restitution has not been made; and so, in order that each one may have his own, in order that that equality may be preserved which justice prescribes, restitution is of strict obligation whenever commutative justice has been violated. It is an obligation of justice, and so it is a grave one, unless the matter be light.

As justice may be violated either by taking away from another what belongs to him, or by damaging or destroying his property, so we may consider restitution as being due either because one has what belongs to another, or because he has inflicted on him unjust damage and loss. These are called by theologians the roots of restitution. We will treat of them successively, and finally of the obligation of making restitution on account of co-operation in injustice.