CHAPTER III
THE SECOND ROOT OF RESTITUTION
SECTION I
On Damnification in General
i. WHOEVER wilfully causes unjust damage to another, even though he himself obtained nothing by his unjust action, is bound to make restitution to him as far as he can. For he is the unjust cause why another has not what belongs to him, and in order that justice may be done he must cause the person damaged to be put as far as possible in the same condition as he was in before the damage was done. He must then make restitution not only for all the damage which he intentionally caused, but for all consequent losses as far as they were in general foreseen.
2. In order that such an obligation may be imposed, certain conditions must be fulfilled which it will be well to state more explicitly.
(a) The damage must be inflicted voluntarily, with knowledge and the will to do the wrong. For a man is only responsible in the forum of conscience for his free and voluntary actions. There must be theological fault, as theologians express it, otherwise there will be no obligation in conscience to make good any damage, at any rate before lawful sentence of a judge competent to impose such an obligation. For the law sometimes imposes the obligation of making good damage which has been done, even though it was not foreseen or intended. This is especially the case when there has been legal negligence or the omission of that diligence which the law requires in the circumstances. There are three degrees in this negligence: " Ordinary neglect has been defined to be the omission of that care which every man of common prudence, and capable of governing a family, takes of his own concerns; gross neglect is defined to be the want of that care which every man of common sense, however inattentive soever, takes of his own property; and slight neglect to be the omission of that diligence which very circumspect and thoughtful persons use
