crime, and generally, whenever the defence of ourselves, or of the innocent, or the good of the delinquent himself, or of our hearers, require the truth to be made known.
5. If by listening to a detractor we encourage him to slander another, we are formal co-operators in his sin and are as guilty as the detractor himself. If our listening is not indeed the efficacious cause of the detraction, we do not sin against justice, but we sin against charity if we could prevent the detraction and do not do so. For charity obliges us, as we saw above, to correct an erring brother and to prevent harm being done to our neighbour as far as possible. It is true that private individuals will seldom be bound by a grave obligation in this matter; frequently they could not intervene without doing more harm than good; but those in authority are more frequently and more strictly bound to correct their subjects and to defend their reputation against slander.
6. Inasmuch as detraction, calumny, and other sins of the like nature are contrary to justice, they will always leave the obligation of making restitution as far as possible for the unjust damage which they cause, as we saw above when treating of restitution.
