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CHAPTER VIII

WHAT EXCUSES FROM OBSERVING THE LAW

i . THE natural law continues to have binding force even though its observance entails great inconvenience. We must not commit murder to save the State, nor are we allowed to tell a lie in order to preserve human life. [1] Positive law, however, does not bind with the same rigour. Our Lord taught us [2] that even the positive divine law does not bind men when great inconvenience would follow from its observance. It is an axiom that necessity has no law. This is all the more true of positive human law, which must be accommodated to the moral strength of the majority of the people, otherwise it will be impossible to observe it, and nobody can be bound to do what is impossible. So that not only physical impossibility excuses from the observance of the law, but also any relatively great difficulty or serious inconvenience which constitutes moral impossibility (Can. 2205).

No general rule can be given for estimating the degree of difficulty which would excuse from the duty of observing any particular law in the concrete. The importance of the law, the intention of the legislator, the results of non-observance of the law, the degree of difficulty in the special case, must all be considered, and a prudent judgement given in view of all the circumstances.

2. A law binds those to its observance who are subject to it, but it does not oblige people to remain subject to it. If I do not like living under a particular law, the law does not prevent me from going elsewhere into territory where it does not bind, and thus freeing myself from the duty of observing it. If I do not like abstaining from flesh meat on days of abstinence, I may lawfully go and live in Spain, get my Bulla Cructata, and enjoy my flesh meat. Such an action will be perfectly lawful, even if I directly intend to withdraw myself from the authority of the law. I have the right to use my liberty to go and live where I choose as far as the law is concerned. And when I am outside the particular territory subject to the law, it no longer binds me.

  1. Inn. Ill, c. Super eo, de usuris.
  2. Matt. xii.