by which the Chinese merchants in Mongolia undersell the Russian merchant in cotton goods might easily be covered by a preferential customs or excise due levied on all but Russian wares. This is an illustration of the extent to which British commercial interests will be affected in the Far East, if Russia forces China to violate the principle of the open door in Inner or Outer Mongolia or Eastern Turkestan.
If Russia only insists upon the recognition by Young China of Mongolia's autonomous rights, Great Britain, after sending an expedition to Tibet for a very similar purpose, cannot reasonably object, especially if such recognition will save the wretched Mongols from oppression. But if the Russian Government is going to be forced by the Russian Nationalist party into securing special privileges in Outer China, Great Britain and the other four powers will be justified in looking upon her as pursuing aims and methods wholly opposed to the principle of the open door.
It must not be forgotten, also, that Russia's policy, in the Far East, as elsewhere, always tends to be actuated by a desire to secure material advantages for her subjects. As I have shown above, her commercial interests in many parts of Outer China have suffered by Chinese economic expansion in recent years. Russia's economic policy in neutral markets is exclusive and protective and hostile to the open door. On the other hand, British trade has recently found a new market through the medium of enterprising Chinese merchants in Mongolia. However sympathetic, therefore, Russian and British high policies may be in Central Asia, the same cannot be said of the economic policies of the two
