The Erzerum Offensive
the Dardanelles in April 1915. This move certainly had the effect of preventing the Turks from sending any further reinforcements to the Armenian front, since now for the first time they were occupied with two fronts instead of with only one. Moreover the defence of the Dardanelles was vital to the safety of the capital, and placed a special strain on their reserves. In those days the Turks had to rely chiefly upon their own efforts, since the German road to the East had not yet been opened by the adhesion of Bulgaria to the Central Powers. It is now clear that the Western Allies had at that time a great opportunity, if they had but known it, to strike Turkey in her weakest spot. But if the Dardanelles campaign is generally regarded as a failure, it must not be forgotten that its indirect effects on the eastern theatres of war were far-reaching. The holding up of large Turkish forces for the defence of Constantinople without doubt saved the situation in the Caucasus, and gave the necessary time to Russia, who is always slow to develop her full military strength. Russia's other occupations in Poland and Galicia had drawn away much of her energy. She could not mobilize her forces at all more quickly than Turkey, who had only the Caucasus front to attend to. Both Empires are equally badly supplied with railways, and both are in a primitive industrial state.
The indirect value of the Dardanelles campaign was perhaps even more clearly felt in Russia during the Summer and Autumn of 1915 than it was in the Spring, for in May the Germans commenced their great Galician drive, and continued during the summer months their victorious advance through Poland. The 2nd Caucasus
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