our own decisions as to military plans and the principles of our organization and action among the prisoners of war in Russia, Italy, Serbia, and France.
From the very beginning of our revolutionary work Masaryk had never for a moment lost sight of his proposal for a large army. In political terms he formulated this in February 1915 somewhat as follows:
If we establish an army we shall acquire a new juridical status as regards Austria and the Allies. A further step might possibly consist of a formal declaration of war upon Austria-Hungary. This will create a political situation enabling us to attain at least our minimum demands when peace is negotiated. In any case, neither the Allies nor Vienna will be able to pass us by in silence if we have soldiers. The Allies and our people at home will have a compensatory means of attaining concessions to our national cause, even if it were to turn out badly. But without a decisive and military struggle we shall obtain nothing from anybody.
That was how our scheme was formulated before we had actually ventured to reckon with certainty upon complete success.
By its military activity the National Council became connected with one of the important factors in the whole war. France, then desperately defending herself for the second year against enormous pressure from Germany, was suffering great losses in man power, and was continually needing more and more soldiers for her front. Many difficult negotiations were being carried on in England and America by the French for the purpose of securing reinforcements. This question continued to occupy the Allies until the end of the war, and up to the last moment it had a decisive bearing upon our movement and the whole of our war policy.
Thus, in the spring of 1916 Russia agreed to send about 400,000 soldiers to the French front. This undertaking was carried out only to a very small extent, the actual number of Russians thus supplied being about 10,000, under the leadership of General Lokhvitsky. When it was ascertained what obstacles the dispatch of Russian troops would involve, the question was asked first by us, later also by French Government circles, whether it would not be possible to send to France, together with the Russian troops also, detachments of Czechoslovak prisoners of war from whom the national Czechoslovak Army in France could be organized. It was upon this
