advantage, both as regards the duration of the war and also the further political consequences which we would derive from this contingency. What it really meant was that the problem of the integral character of Austria-Hungary, and thus the whole question of the reorganization of Central Europe, had again emerged. As far as we were concerned, any such tendency coming at that particular time was all to the good. Moreover, in consequence of this, the Poles were brought closer to the Allies, and began to have a serious interest in the struggle against the Habsburg Empire.
It seemed to us that the whole situation of Germany and Austria-Hungary was complicated by two diametrically opposing tendencies. On the one hand, there were those who favoured arrogance and intimidation, and on the other, there were the alarmists, whose endeavour it was, by means of intrigues and secret negotiations, to obtain peace with decisive promptness. This is what we instinctively felt, and from time to time we received proofs that such was the case. The undeniable military victories of the Central Powers at this juncture caused us some dismay, even though they did not deprive us of our hope and our optimism. We were convinced that Austria-Hungary would not be able to hold out, but we were misled by certain events, and also by the tactical measures of the Central Powers. We could interpret the Austro-German proclamation concerning Poland as a manifestation of power and self-confidence. A number of internal events in Austria and Hungary tended to produce the same impression. Thus, the projected unification of Cis-leithan territories in a single constitutional whole under the name of “Austria,” with the exclusion of Galicia, the regulations concerning the use of the German language, Tisza’s dictatorship in Hungary, the economic preparations and discussions on the subject of “Mittel-Europa”—all these things bewildered and alarmed us.
But the secret news from Prague which depicted the situation as being desperate, weakened the effect of these impressions, and often gave rise to the conjecture that the two Central Powers were not undertaking peace moves from a consciousness of power, but to strengthen themselves internally, and as a result of misgivings, if not actual alarm, as to the future.
These reflections and misgivings of ours were upset on October 21st by a regular bombshell. Friedrich Adler had killed Prime Minister Stürgkh with a revolver-shot. Koerber had
