thus to gain both for them and for the neutrals the information necessary for clearing up the situation, and for making it possible, at the psychological moment, to start peace negotiations.
It was now that we in Paris felt most alarmed. We had already heard that both in Vienna and Berlin they were placing a certain amount of hope upon a peace intervention prepared by President Wilson. The papers had, at the same time, published reports to the effect that Mr. Gerard, the American Ambassador in Berlin, had been summoned to Washington for this purpose, and that Count Tarnowski, the new Austro-Hungarian Ambassador who had replaced Dumba at Washington after the latter had been withdrawn on account of his well-known intrigues against America, would be favourably received by Wilson.
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Our uncertainty and alarm were increased when, during the period of excitement while preparations were being made for an answer to the peace overtures of the Central Powers and also to President Wilson’s inquiry as to war aims, we received confidential reports with regard to projected secret peace negotiations, partly with Germany, partly with Austria-Hungary.
On December 20, 1916, Prince Brancaccio, head of the intelligence department of the Italian Military Mission in Paris, came to me with reports about peace negotiations between Germany, France, and Russia. Brancaccio was obviously perturbed. All similar reports about peace negotiations carried on without the direct participation or official knowledge of Italy gave the Italians the impression that their interests were going to be sacrificed. As far as I observed them, the Italians—whether they belonged to non-official political circles or whether they were in an official position—constantly had one idea in mind: they had entered the war, and in return for that were promised Trentino, Dalmatia, Trieste, and the Littoral. If the war were concluded before Austria-Hungary was compelled to grant these concessions, they would neither receive what was promised nor an adequate return for their share in the war. In this case it would be clear that they would have done better to have remained neutral (as Giolitti wished) and let Austria-Hungary and Germany reward them accordingly.
