paper on January 3rd. On the same day I endeavoured to counteract the intention at the Quai d’Orsay of satisfying us otherwise than by the express mention of our aims in the note to Wilson. I visited Robert de Caix, a friend of Berthelot and an expert on colonial and Eastern European matters at the Quai d’Orsay. I asked him to let the Foreign Office have my reasons in favour of a direct mention of our aims in the note, and he expressed his willingness to intervene with Berthelot.
Finally, I applied for support to our friend August Gauvain. I wrote for the Journal des Debats an original letter from Austria, containing the latest news which we had received from Prague. The letter was published towards the end of December. In a leading article Gauvain referred to it, and demanded an unequivocal declaration of the Allies against Austria-Hungary and in favour of the oppressed nations. Other papers also took notice of it, and in this way exerted an influence on public opinion and Government circles.
On January 4th Kammerer invited me for a final interview. He informed me that, on principle, the Quai d’Orsay was resolved to do something for us, but that the form of action was still being considered. A decision would probably be reached at the Inter-Allied Conference then being held in Rome. So far, the Allies had agreed that the note should express in general terms the necessity for liberating the Austro-Hungarian Slavs, the Italians, the Rumanians. What made it difficult to mention the Czechs and Slovaks specifically was, that if this were done, it would be necessary to refer in a similar manner to the Jugoslavs, a course against which the Italians were fundamentally opposed. France would, however, do what she could. I again, and for the last time, urged upon Kammerer how essential it was not to forget the Slovaks, and, as I have already mentioned, I suggested the formula to the effect that one of the Allied war aims was “the liberation of the Czechs united with Slovakia” or else “the liberation of the Czechoslovaks,” leaving the Allies, of course, free to word it in accordance with the context.
On January 7th the Quai d’Orsay at last informed me that the Allies had accepted the French proposal, and that the liberation of the Czechoslovaks would be expressly mentioned in the note. The reference to the Czechoslovaks in the note had been accepted by the Allies as an amendment after the previous formula had already been sanctioned. This formula spoke of the establishment of an independent Poland with access to the
