bureaucratic reserve and the self-assurance of his manner as a diplomat. At the same time the general tendencies of official Italian policy at that period prompted me to be extremely guarded.
However, I expounded our cause, explaining why I had come to Italy, and what significance the Czech problem had in its bearings upon the struggle against Austria-Hungary. I pointed out that here our interests were identical with those of Italy, and that an independent Czechoslovakia would be an important factor in the affairs of Italy after the war. I added that we were anxious to organize our prisoners of war and to create a national army. For this purpose we were applying to Italy for assistance, just as we had already done in France. Finally, I made no secret of our relations with the Jugoslavs. We were quite sincere in acclaiming them as a kindred race, but we wanted them to arrive at an agreement with Italy on a basis involving reasonable compromise and action in common, for which purpose we wished to work on both sides.
Demartino acknowledged the importance of our affairs. Italy was investigating them and would continue to do so, but for the time being the most important question for her was the Italo-Jugoslav dispute. The Jugoslavs must bear in mind that Italy had an agreement with the Allies and, having regard to this, they must make concessions accordingly. He said that we should bring our influence to bear upon them in this sense. In Dalmatia the towns were, he stated, Italian, and the statistics produced as a result of the official Austrian census were inaccurate. Altogether, as far as culture was concerned, Dalmatia was really Italian. Moreover, the Italian claims were based upon considerations of strategy and national security. Apart from this, he agreed that the rest of the southern regions of the monarchy should be given to Serbia, or to whatever State might subsequently be formed there—either Greater Serbia or Croatia and Serbia. Demartino emphasized these concluding ideas, which indicated his reserve on the subject of national and State unification.
From this conversation I obtained a first-hand knowledge of the difficulties which Italian diplomacy was causing, and would continue to cause, as far as Jugoslav affairs were concerned. And although Demartino did not expressly mention the fact, it was clear to me that he was opposed to the unification of the Jugoslavs. I also had a definite feeling that he
