asking me to proceed from Rome direct to London. He wanted to discuss the political situation which had arisen after the last Allied Note to Wilson, and to decide what inferences could be drawn from it as far as our interests were concerned. He was also anxious to decide what action to take with regard to our affairs in Russia, where at that time the energies of Štefánik were being almost entirely exhausted by the dispute between Kiev and Petrograd, between Dürich and his opponents, who were on our side. Masaryk had some misgivings as to whether Štefánik’s course of action was the right one. Then, too, I was to report to him on the situation in Italy and arrange the further organization of our work in Rome.
In the last week of January I concluded the whole of my negotiations. I had one more interview with Demartino, who again assured me that what had already been promised would be carried out. I also saw Barrère and Giers again, and settled the further co-operation between our office in Rome and the Paris headquarters of the National Council. On leaving Rome I travelled by way of Paris, where my stay was very short, to London, where I arrived on February 5th. After having discussed the above-mentioned points with Masaryk, I returned to Paris on February 13th.
(c) The Entry of the United States into the War, and our Movement
56
At Paris we eagerly waited to see what effect would be produced at Vienna and Berlin by the Allied reply of December 30th and the note to President Wilson. We were no less curious as to the reports which we should receive from Prague, and how our people there would react to our diplomatic success contained in the note to President Wilson. These are matters, however, to which I shall refer later.
The violent official reply of Germany and Austria-Hungary, stating that the Allied declaration denoted war until the final victory of the Central Powers, taken into conjunction with the confidential reports which we had previously received from Prague, led us to surmise that at Vienna a drama was being enacted which was overwhelming the responsible personalities there. For whenever any decisive action was taken against the Allies, the Austro-Hungarian leaders were either
