politicians in London. Štefánik had then left for Paris, on the day that I arrived in London.
Masaryk’s journey to Russia was thus postponed for a month, the delay being partly due to the fact that on his return to London he fell ill and had to remain in bed for two weeks. Upon the conclusions he had formed from Štefánik’s report, he told me that the time had now come when he could most opportunely intervene in Russia. He had not been greatly disposed to go to Russia while the old regime was in power. While preparing for the journey, he felt misgivings that he would never return. He had heard reports of intrigues against his personal safety, and he had also felt uneasy about the possible danger from submarines. Then, too, there was the likelihood of treachery or unforeseen developments in Russia. He had therefore written his will (together with some political notes) in the form of a letter addressed to me. He had given it to his daughter Olga, with the message that I was to act as his executor if he did not return.
I was deeply touched by this episode which occurred when we had little time for personal feelings. I am not sentimental, but I sat for hours over that sealed letter in August 1917, and wondered what would happen to Masaryk and what would be the fate of our movement.
Štefánik had returned from Russia with a number of new plans. First in London, then in Paris, he had given an account of his experiences, and he wanted to make a similar report in Rome. He had a good opportunity for doing so, as Carlotti, the Italian Ambassador in Petrograd, had given him messages for his Roman friends. He therefore proceeded to Rome in May 1917 and spent about a month there.
His second plan, which he had evolved while in Russia, was to go to the United States. He had returned from Russia with scanty results in the military affairs on which he had been sent there by the French Government, but he had not lost hope that our military endeavours would finally meet with success. He saw that our work in connection with the prisoners of war in France was making considerable progress, and he still felt confident that it would be possible to transport a number of our prisoners of war from Russia. Indeed, he himself had already prepared the first contingent in Rumania for this purpose. What he therefore proposed to do in the United States was to assist in organizing the volunteer movement