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CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL ARMY
185

their attention to our endeavours. In this way he gained the sympathies of several military men and notably of Roosevelt. Towards President Wilson he maintained an attitude of reserve, and he continued to do so, even to a greater extent, at the Peace Conference. There was much in Wilson’s democratic ideas and his political tendencies with which Štefánik was unable to agree. In this connection, I should recall the valuable work accomplished by Štefánik in overcoming the difficulties of organization among the Czech and Slovak colonists in America. From the end of June I kept him informed in detail about the progress of our military movement in France, and about my negotiations with the French Government for the purpose of obtaining official permission to constitute a Czechoslovak Army of liberation. On July 17th I was able to notify him that this had been secured, and on August 10, 1917, in a letter which was taken by Franklin-Bouillon, I announced to the National Alliance that the agreement between the National Council and the French Government was complete.

This accelerated the success of the volunteer movement in America, especially as in the meanwhile Masaryk had adjusted our military organization in Russia, and our brigade, by distinguishing itself at Zborov on June 3rd, 1917, helped indirectly to promote the success of our military schemes with the other Allies.

(b) Agreement with France on the Subject of our Army. French Policy ond it Attitude to Austro-Hungarian Problems

59

After Štefánik’s departure to America I embarked upon a series of activities, the scope of which I made as wide as possible. In this I was prompted by the success which our movement had scored in organizing a strong army, more especially in Western Europe. My tactics would have been the same, so far as this was concerned, even if the Russian revolution had not occurred. What I had always feared was that the Western Powers might object to any predominance of Russia in matters affecting Austria-Hungary and ourselves, and my work in the National Council at Paris was guided by the principle of imparting a general European character to every-