were released, would never let themselves be kept back. Then, too, I firmly believed that all the conjectures on the part of France and the other Allies as to the possibility of separating Austria-Hungary from Germany were erroneous, chiefly because, in the end, such an arrangement could not depend upon the will and strength of Vienna and Budapest. I knew that it was merely harmful to take into account the possibility of a separate peace, since it weakened the Allies in their intensity of purpose.
I was never in agreement with those opportunists amongst us who, fearing a premature or undecisive end of the war, or wishing to conceal their alarm and lack of decision, were always asking what guarantees the Allies would give us if we entered on a life-and-death struggle, and what reasons we had for believing that they would not end by deserting us or concluding a premature peace. I had not failed to take these possibilities into account, but I was in agreement with Masaryk’s views; I regarded the struggle against Vienna and Budapest, first and foremost, as a fundamental moral question.
As far as the Allies were concerned, our only guarantee could be the success of our revolutionary activities. The Allies could desert us only if we ourselves were to desert beforehand. This meant a perpetual struggle, and the gradual establishment of our independence during the war by means of our own work and the sacrifice of our own blood. We simply had to thrust our cause into the main streams of world events, in the midst of which it would become too important a factor to be afterwards ignored.
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The actual discussions with the various Ministries concerning the organization of our army caused me some difficulties. I had no military experience, and was aware of the political responsibility with which I was faced as a representative of the National Council. I received ample help from Dr.
