of discussing the question of our prisoners there, and the possibility of their transport to France.
In accordance with the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and with my consent as Secretary of the National Council, the publication of the decree was to take place at a time which, from a political point of view, was more favourable and opportune than July and August 1917. Another important factor in this respect was the circumstance that it was necessary to wait until some considerable number of our prisoners had been concentrated in France. These prisoners, who had been demoralized by their hardships in Serbia, at Asinara, and, at the beginning, in France as well, could not be regarded as the mainstay of our army, the nucleus of which would have to be derived from Russia, Italy, or America. In agreement with both Ministries we centred our hopes largely on my forthcoming visit to Italy, which had been projected as early as June 1917. In common with the French military authorities, we hoped that we should be able to win over several thousand prisoners of war in Italy, and transfer them to the French front. In July 1917 the number of prisoners at our disposal was too small to form our first military contingent.
We therefore agreed that the final text of the decree should be issued after my return from Rome. The publication of the decree was to confirm the existence of the army, and not merely to announce the preparations for it. Only in this way could the political and military significance of our whole undertaking be made duly prominent.
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When all these questions had been fully discussed at the Ministry of War, the matter was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The military authorities, who had to cope with practical problems of warfare, little by little conceded my political demands. The task was far more difficult for me at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where de Margerie and Laroche had carefully considered all the juridical and political implications of the scheme for organizing a national army, as arranged between General Vidalon, Lieut.-Col. Cros, and myself. Accordingly, there now ensued a struggle to preserve the concessions which had been made to the National Council when the scheme had been discussed at the Ministry of War.
