(a) The Italian Government should officially recognize the National Council as the central body representing all Czechoslovak interests, and with this body all Czechoslovak questions (relating to the army and prisoners of war) should be discussed officially, exclusively, and directly.
(b) The Czechs and Slovaks should be recognized as a friendly nation, and that in consequence of this all Czechoslovak civilians interned on Italian territory should be released.
(c) The Italian Government should release all our troops who were anxious to join the Czechoslovak Army, and should consent to their transport to France, just as this had been agreed upon with regard to our prisoners in Russia.
Thus, at the beginning, I did not make any direct demand for the organization of a Czechoslovak Army in Italy. In the first place, the Italian Government had already refused a similar application on the part of the Serbs, and then Brancaccio himself had expressed to me his doubts whether it would be possible to establish our army in Italy without much delay. From what Brancaccio had told me, and also from the attitude which Sonnino had hitherto adopted, I inferred that our demand for the establishment of an army in Italy would be regarded by the Italians as excessive. Then, too, I was afraid that our movement in Western Europe might be split up. It seemed to us unnecessary to have two armies, and, in a technical respect, this would mean two sets of difficulties. Moreover, the French front had greater political and military importance than any other, and to collect only an insignificant number of troops there would mean military and political failure, resulting in a menace to the whole of our movement in France.
For these reasons I had arranged with the French Foreign Ministry, before my departure to Rome, that the main purpose of my discussions there would be to secure from the Italian Government the permission to liberate our prisoners of war in Italy, and to transfer them rapidly to France. Politically, it was most important for our movement to have a large military unit ready for action on the French front with the least possible delay.
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I have already stated that Sonnino surprised me by the frankness of his attitude. He informed me that my statements
