to France would have been. They saw in this a change of front in the Italian policy which would be of considerable significance in its bearings upon the affairs of Austria-Hungary and the Jugoslavs. They therefore advised me strongly to accept the proposal, and to come back to Rome at an early date. In their view we could regard this proposal as a sign that our cause was victorious in Italy. The next step which must come soon, and which was a logical consequence of the present one, would be the formation of an independent Czechoslovak Army, and this would mean that Italy was publicly identifying herself with the policy of destroying the Habsburg Empire. This again, they said, would bring her into official agreement with the scheme for unifying the Jugoslavs.
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It was natural that after these consultations and discussions with diplomats who at that time were playing a leading part in Rome, and who, by notifying their respective Governments to the same effect, were assisting us and our cause, I decided to act in accordance with their advice. I therefore made up my mind to hasten my departure to Paris, where I would deal with the most urgent matters. As I felt confident that before very long it would be possible to induce the Italian Government to take the final step, I planned to return to Rome within three or four weeks for the purpose of definitely settling our military problem in Italy.(31)
After discussing matters with representatives from among our prisoners, who had been released and were already working in the National Council at Rome, I decided in favour of accepting the compromise as indicated. It was clear to me that the Italians would be obliged to concede to-morrow what they did not concede to-day, and that they themselves would abandon their present attitude as soon as the progress made by our movement in France and elsewhere gave them an opportunity of doing so.
I therefore accepted everything I could. With regard to the formation of semi-military labour corps and the discipline to which the prisoners were to be amenable on their release, I made very emphatic reservations in the name of the National Council, so as not to prejudice its future principles or course of action. I formulated all these points in a written communication which was sent to General Giardino on October 8, 1917.
