Government circles considered that the Southern army, which was purely an Austrian one, could be relied upon for all eventualities. Andrássy was in Switzerland and Radev, the Bulgarian Minister, was there too. Svatkovsky had had an opportunity of a conversation with him at Geneva. It was possible to negotiate with them, and it seemed clear that such negotiations would take place. He added that Russia herself was so weak that any final victory on her part was now out of the question. Coming from Svatkovsky, this was a serious admission.
Dr. Sychrava showed Svatkovsky No. 79 of our Russian paper, Čechoslovák, which he had just received, and in which it was stated that “the public opinion of Slavonic Russia, which ought to have the initiative in Slavonic and consequently also in Czechoslovak affairs, unfortunately continues to be in a backward state.” Svatkovsky’s reply to this was a surprising one: “I, too, have reports on that from Vienna. Czernin recently expressed an almost identical opinion. In Vienna they appear to be aware that our success with the Allied Note to Wilson did not proceed from Russia. They conjecture that it was managed by England.” He added that with regard to the peace negotiations a favourable moment was being awaited, and as far as possible it would be when the Germans had suffered some kind of military blow. The general plan would be that Russia would receive Eastern Galicia, Rumania the southern part of the Bukovina, while the share of Serbia would be Bosnia and Herzogovina. Arrangements would be made with Italy for minor concessions, as the latter country was unwilling to fight until the end. Some authorities wanted to let Austria have Upper Silesia in order the more easily to induce her to change sides, and they even reckoned with the possibility that Austria would fight on their side against Germany. We and the Jugoslavs were to receive a certain measure of autonomy within Austria. It was explained that the word “liberation” in the Allied Note to President Wilson was not to be interpreted in the sense of “independence.”
At that time I saw no immediate and direct danger in Svatkovsky’s statement. I, too, had not taken the wording of the note to President Wilson in the sense mentioned, as I had faith in the Allies. I was strongly under the influence of this success which we had achieved, and I myself had seen under what circumstances it had come our way. Nevertheless, I was
