ostensible purpose as that connected with his visit to Switzerland. Matters had already been definitely settled, but at the last moment the scheme proved abortive. These details indicate the general feeling among the authorities at Vienna in the summer of 1917.
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Without awaiting the results of his peace efforts in the West, or comprehending the actual difficulties and obstacles which stood in the way of their realization, Czernin carried on the same manœuvres in the East. He thought that the Russian revolution and its consequences could be well utilized for the benefit of the Central Powers, even by diplomatic means, and that the precarious situation of Russia might cause the Russian revolutionaries to conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers, if skilful advantage were taken of the new circumstances. Czernin therefore, supported by Karl and Zita, with perseverance and skill continued his peace efforts.
From an international and also internal point of view, the spring of 1917 was certainly the final date for Austria to conclude a peace which would more or less maintain her existence, although, of course, with the loss of some of her territory. Czernin’s whole policy shows that he realized this fact. Herein we find an explanation of the steps taken by Czernin from the outbreak of the Russian revolution to the victory at Caporetta. After the latter battle, and more particularly after the conclusion of peace with the victorious Bolsheviks, he slightly changed his attitude and procedure.
(c) Our Liberation Movement Abroad and our Policy at Home
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I must now discuss our policy at home and its relations to our movement abroad. In the first place, this was just the period when our policy at home definitely emerged from its previous passivity. Then, too, the overtures for a separate peace with Vienna were made at a period when the Viennese Government was passing through the most critical phases of its existence during the war, and when its chief concern was to prevent
