ceremonies, and we will see that this produces an appropriate effect here.
I therefore repeat that these are essential for our preservation, which to-day rests in your hands.
1. Not to vote with the Government on any point.
2. Not to be present at the manifestations of loyalty in Parliament.
3. The Radicals at least, if not all, must set up a passive opposition.
4. Not to disavow us.
5. To demand State rights.
Whatever you do, there must be no repetition of the mistake made in 1848. None of you must vindicate the existence of Austria. Remember that there is a revolution in Russia, and that Russia will be a republic.
Finally, it is our wish that influence should again be brought to bear upon our troops. If the Slavonic regiments on the Italian front were to offer resistance, this would be interpreted as showing Austria’s vitality. It would therefore do us much harm. In this matter do all that you can.
78
On May 19th, on the initiative of Jaroslav Kvapil, the poet and dramatist, was published the proclamation of the 150 Czech authors who felt the same misgivings as we did abroad, and in trenchant terms called upon the responsible Czech politicians to speak and act in Parliament on behalf of the Czech nation as the nation really desired. And even though it was not stated in so many words, this declaration meant that the Czech parties in Parliament should declare themselves in favour of the programme of the Czech revolutionary movement abroad, and in favour of a restoration of the Czech State, including Slovakia, without the dynasty and irrespective of the Habsburg Empire.
In Paris we received a summary of the declaration only a few days after it was published, and shortly after that the full text. It made us feel that we need have no further misgivings as to the session of Parliament. We realized the difficult situation of our leading politicians at home, and we did not expect them to achieve impossibilities. All that we wanted was that they should not lose ground. In Allied circles we emphasized that our programme was identical with theirs, even though there was a divergency in our tactics. We also insisted that we had no desire to expose our people to persecution unnecessarily. We had reasons for believing that the position of Vienna would grow worse and worse, and we therefore felt confident that now we
