against the dynastic autocracy of Central Europe, the subversive tendencies of the Russian revolution, and the definite acceptance of the principles involving the self-determination of nations. The latter item, in particular, was intended to bring about the dismemberment of the most Catholic of the great Powers, and the removal of the most Catholic of the dynasties, and the whole affair was entirely alien to the feelings, wishes, aims, and interests of the Vatican. Thus was accentuated the great divergency between the two belligerent parties; one side consisted of democratic France, England, Belgium, Italy, Serbia, joined later by revolutionary Russia, and the democratic United States, all of whom were waging war against the militaristic and dynastic autocracies of Central Europe. Accordingly the Vatican, as an inveterate champion and representative of tradition, of hierarchy, and of all autocratic, dynastic, and aristocratic principles, could not do otherwise than pursue the policy with which it had always been identified, and had always openly acknowledged. For reasons of its spiritual affinity it was antagonistic to those who represented the ideals and principles of modern democracy, involving respect for the individual, the spirit of tolerance in its fullest acceptation, and the interests of progress in political, economic, social, religious, and moral aspects of life.
For these reasons the Vatican could not look with favour upon the prospect of an Allied victory. On the other hand, its purpose would not have been served by an integral victory on the part of Germany and the Pan-German schemes in Central Europe, in Turkey, and the Near East generally. Nor could the Vatican be expected to approve of the presence of Turkey among the Central Powers. But compared with the misgivings which it felt at the thought of an Allied victory, this was a far lesser evil. What would have suited the Vatican best would have been peace on the basis of the status quo with a few minor changes, such as the restoration of a Catholic Poland, the removal of Russian influence from the Balkans, and a few territorial concessions from Vienna to Italy. Such were the ideas in the entourage of Benedict XV, and they may be taken as forming the broad outline of his war-time policy.
It should be added that the diplomatic relations of Vienna and Berlin with the Vatican were better than those of the Entente States. From 1907 onwards the influence of the Central Powers in the organization and diplomatic policy of the
