rulers of Germany, and that any idea of peace negotiations was out of the question until the necessary commitments could be obtained from the nations of the Central Powers.
This reply was a severe blow to the Papal note. Immediately after it was issued we were able to observe the advantages which we were likely to derive from the Pope’s action. The hopes of the Habsburg Empire had again collapsed, and the principles of democracy and the self-determination of nations had been emphatically enunciated by the most powerful authority in the Allied camp. At a time when the repeated attempts at a premature peace and the uncertainty as to what would happen in Russia were causing us serious concern, we were greatly encouraged by this circumstance.
82
In spite of this obvious failure, the Vatican did not give up hope of being able to bring about peace negotiations. The attitude of the Berlin Government on the subject of Belgium induced the Vatican to approach it again through Pacelli, with a view to obtaining a clearer expression of opinion. At the same time Benedict sent a personal letter to Emperor Karl, asking him to use his influence with Berlin to bring about a change of attitude as regards Belgium on the lines of the Papal note of August 1st. In the same letter the Pope urged Karl not to refuse discussions with Italy on the subject of the Trentino. Karl replied by letter on October 4th and promised that he would intervene at Berlin on the subject of Belgium, and declared himself ready to discuss the question of ceding a part of the Trentino in return for compensation in colonies. He concluded by saying that Austria-Hungary was willing to evacuate the Balkan countries under definite guarantees of safety. On October 24th the Pope wrote a letter of thanks for this favourable communication, and expressed himself as being gratified at Karl’s attitude. This letter, however, reached Vienna at the time of the Caporetta victory, and in the meanwhile Kühlmann had replied to Pacelli on the subject of Belgium in less accommodating terms than those of Michaelis’s reply to the Papal note of September 19th. Vienna, having occupied further Italian territory, was no longer disposed to negotiate with defeated Italy on the subject of the Trentino. In a speech delivered at Budapest on October 4, 1917, Czernin threatened that if the Allies did not accept the offers of the Central Powers,
