In Italy the situation was even more precarious. The vacillation of the Government, and particularly of Sonnino, on war aims ; the twofold policy towards Germany and Austria respectively ; the action of the Pope, which undoubtedly tended to exert a demoralizing effect on Italian public opinion; and, finally, the propaganda carried on by the Socialist neutralists—all this led to a profound crisis in home policy and lack of resolution at the front. The crisis developed towards the end of October 1917 into the fall of Boselli’s Government, and to a far more serious complication, namely, the reverse at Caporetta in the last week of October. Nor was Orlando’s new Government able to extricate the country from the effects of this disaster for some time to come.
In Russia and on the Eastern front, of course, the conditions were far more critical. The proclamation of the Russian Republic and the arrival of Kerensky’s new Government could not counteract the increasing disruption in the army and in affairs as a whole. The chaos which thus ensued culminated in the Kornilov affair and then in the Bolshevik upheaval. At the beginning of December the new Bolshevik Government itself suggested the question of a military armistice to the Central Powers, and the necessary negotiations actually took place.
In England also these events naturally produced a profound impression. The greatest alarm was caused by the events in Russia and the possible consequences which might arise from them as regards the Far East and India.
The knowledge of these developments was naturally a source of encouragement to the German Supreme Command. As early as the summer of 1917 the German military leaders had decided upon a big offensive on the Italian front in order to reassure Czernin, who was urging the necessity to negotiate for peace without annexation or indemnities. Ever since May 1917 the authorities at Berlin had indicated to him that his fears were exaggerated, and the German victory at Caporetta went far to confirm their opinion. Then, too, the elimination of the Eastern front brought the separate peace with Russia, for which Czernin had made such efforts, and for which he had been willing to make such commitments beforehand. Now it was placed at his disposal unconditionally and without any commitments whatever. Hence the military victory of Germany against Italy and Russia, combined with the events in the Allied countries, denoted the political defeat of Vienna and of Czernin, who were compelled to subordinate their own views to those of the