ment for its representative to meet the Austro-Hungarian delegate for exchanging views on peace questions affecting only those two countries. On November 11th Czernin expressed his agreement with this on principle, but with certain reservations, which showed that his opinion of the general situation had changed since the previous April. He was willing to accept any communication which the British Government might make to him, and Count Mensdorff-Pouilly could at any time proceed to Switzerland for this purpose. On December 1, 1917, Sir Horace Rumbold sent Parodi a letter, in which he repeated the former communication, and asked for the date when the delegate from Vienna would arrive. After long negotiations, during which the Austrians expressed their desire that the British Government should send somebody of the same standing as Count Mensdorff, who was the oldest and most important Austro-Hungarian diplomat, it was agreed that the British delegate was to be General Smuts, and that the meeting was to take place on December 18th at Geneva in the villa of the Austro-Hungarian Consul Montlong. General Smuts arrived at the stipulated time and he was accompanied by Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s secretary.
In his conversations, General Smuts showed a very strong anti-German attitude, but it would appear that he was far more indulgent towards the Habsburg Empire. His projected scheme with regard to Austria-Hungary involved something similar to the British Empire with the self-governing dominions, and at the conclusion of his interview with Mensdorff he repudiated the idea of dismemberment of Austria-Hungary.
Mensdorff’s final suggestion was that General Smuts should meet Czernin himself, as the latter would best be able to decide whether Austria-Hungary could influence the Germans against the programme of German militarism. In accordance with the instructions which Czernin had given him, he endeavoured to prepare a way for direct contact between German and British diplomacy. When, however, General Smuts emphatically declined to have any dealings with the Germans, he did not insist, but again, acting on Czernin’s instructions, intimated that it was useless to try and bring about a separate peace without Berlin.
85
This was Czernin’s last peace overture. He undertook it in the conviction that every opportunity should be taken to end
