He first of all brought about order in home affairs. He eliminated the direct and indirect causes of defeatism, and he concentrated around him a great majority of the Parliament whom he inspired with fresh confidence. As Minister of War he devoted himself chiefly to the preparation of victory, leaving the diplomatic side of affairs to S. Pichon, his Foreign Minister, although he himself decided, either partly or completely, about matters of high policy.
Under his regime the view which superseded all others was that the interests of all the Allies coincided; that there must be a united military and diplomatic front; that in order to solve the political war problems satisfactorily the main requirement was to end the war by a military victory in common. Towards the end of March, at the very moment when the Germans were taking the first steps for their last great offensive on the Western front, General Foch was appointed supreme Allied Commander. Clemenceau realized the necessity of sending the Italians reinforcements after the reverse at Caporetta, and in the same way he understood how essential it was for the Allies to put forth their utmost resources for the attainment of victory. He therefore supported the formation of a Polish Army and concluded negotiations with us for the establishment of a Czechoslovak Army. At a later date he saw the significance of our movement in Siberia, and he did everything in his power to enable our troops to reach France.
The negotiations between General Smuts and Count Mensdorff-Pouilly began before Clemenceau took office, and they were completed a month after he made his first proclamation in Parliament on the subject of undecisive peace and the alternative which he favoured. It may therefore be safely assumed that he was aware of these events. When Lloyd George made his speech on January 5, 1918, Clemenceau sent him a telegram of congratulation to which I have already referred. I have also given my reason for supposing that this telegram had no bearing upon the Austro-Hungarian question in a sense unfavourable to us.
By this time the French Government was conscious of its commitments to us. When Clemenceau came into power, the text of the decree authorizing the formation of our army, as well as the statutes of the army, had practically been completed by agreement with the preceding Government of Painlevé. In Russia the organization of the army was making
