culmination just at this time, and it was under these circumstances that there were new secret negotiations with Austria-Hungary for the purpose of an agreement, in which the Italian war aims would necessarily have been abandoned. Indeed, the whole of Italian public opinion inferred from two important speeches by Lloyd George and Wilson on January 5 and 8, 1918, that this agreement had actually been reached. At that time the Government were naturally acquainted also with the details of Smuts’ secret negotiations at Geneva. When on February 13th Balfour made his Parliamentary statement on the Geneva negotiations with Austria-Hungary, the full gravity of the events as far as Italy was concerned were plainly acknowledged in the Press there.
There was another reason, however, why the situation was serious for Italy. Wilson’s speech containing the famous fourteen points made it clear that the London Pact between Italy and the Allies could not be carried out.(39) This was the most severe blow which had been sustained by Sonnino’s policy, and Government circles, as well as public opinion, which had hitherto taken its stand completely on the London Pact, were perhaps even more affected by it than by the words addressed to Vienna. Nor was it essentially mitigated even by Wilson’s declaration of war on Austria-Hungary after the reverse at Caporetta. This was the psychological moment for a fundamental change in the line of policy which had hitherto been followed by the Italian Government both in political and military matters. It would seem that to a certain extent the Government had become aware of the mistakes in its previous course of action, i.e. the waging of what was known as “our war” (guerra nostra), “the Italian War,” the rejection of a common front, certain considerations shown to Germany, violent and unnecessary disputes with the Jugoslavs on the subject of the London Pact, signs of compromise with regard to the oppressed nations of Austria-Hungary, and altogether a marked hesitation to adopt a definite attitude towards the problem of the existence of the Habsburg Empire.(40) With this was correlated an uncertain and undecided internal policy. After the serious military reverse the greater part of public opinion realized this, and assigned the blame to the faulty and uncertain Government policy. Thus, all these last events were interpreted as being so many blows directed against Sonnino’s tactics.
