ments for a visit to Rome. He shared my view that the Italian Government would ultimately give its consent and, after the publication of our army decree in France, Brancaccio held the same opinion. For several months I had been giving him detailed information about our negotiations in Paris, and he had passed this on to the Supreme Italian Command. We had good reason to believe that the Italian military authorities had practically decided at the end of January that our army was to be sanctioned.
This is indicated by the proposals of General Giardino in January and February 1918, to the Supreme Military Council at Versailles, and by the report which Colonel T. Marchetti, head of the Military Intelligence Section, submitted on February 5, 1918, to the Ministry of War and the Supreme Italian Command. It was here that our long contact with the Italian Intelligence Service stood us in good stead. Marchetti’s report showed a great appreciation of our work, and also a considerable knowledge of the conditions in the Austro-Hungarian Army. He rejected Sonnino’s international arguments against the formation of a Czechoslovak Army, and supported his proposals by referring to the examples of Russia and France.
At all events, by the beginning of February, the Italian command had formed a plan analogous to that previously adopted in Russia for utilizing the Czechoslovak military forces, The Italian commanders at the front had many opportunities of seeing how the Czechoslovak troops behaved there, and how they risked their lives in the interests of their cause. It was thus obvious that they would be reliable supporters of Italy against the Habsburg Empire, that they could supply useful information to the Italians, and that by surrendering they helped to demoralize the Austrian front. The natural conclusion from this was that Czechoslovak detachments should be established all along the front, as they would prove a greater advantage to Italy than a single military unit. The need for some such step as this became even more urgent after the retreat on the Piave. The only opposition to the scheme came from Sonnino.
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All these events led me to consider the scheme for organized labour detachments as the last manœuvre for hindering the
