mented from the ranks of our prisoners in Italy. I do not know exactly whether this idea originated with Štefánik or with the Italian authorities. I only know that Štefánik would have agreed to it, and that at first it met with the approval of military circles in Italy. Incidentally, I have ascertained that this solution was suggested by General Cadorna as early as January or February 1918 to the Supreme Military Council at Versailles. His successor, General Giardino, repeated the proposal on February 24, 1918, with a slight modification, his chief demand being that our troops in France should be sent to Italy, and Orlando in March 1918 again urged the French Government to express an opinion on this proposal. Štefánik’s plan was a similar one, and as far as I can infer (I had an opportunity of discussing the point with him) it was conceived independently of the Italian suggestions. When, finally, it was submitted to me as Secretary of the National Council, after having been previously discussed by the French and Italian Governments, and by the military authorities at Versailles, I opposed it. The view I took was that if the situation were such as to permit it, Italy would in the end grant us our army. I was not opposed to this solution on principle, but I insisted that if we were to give our consent to such a change, Italy should clearly undertake to place at our disposal all our prisoners who were on Italian territory. In other respects I was opposed to the integral realization of this plan, as I regarded it as essential that at least a part of our troops should remain on the French front. Besides this, at the beginning of March, owing to the exacting demand of the French military authorities, the organization and training of our army had not made sufficient progress to justify the use of our regiments at the front. After consultation with General Janin we replied in this sense to General Foch. The plan accordingly came to nothing.
The negotiations which Štefánik began towards the end of February enabled him at least to acquaint himself thoroughly with the attitude of the Italian Government. Before the middle of March he had had interviews with Orlando, Sonnino, Bissolati, and Diaz, and he had also been received by the King. The reasons which Sonnino gave him to justify his opposition to the establishment of our army were as follows:
1. Humanitarian considerations: Italy could not guarantee ultimate success in the war, and was therefore unable to accept
