National Council and the Jugoslav Committee, there emerged our first conflicts with the Italians, with the Jugoslavs, and partly also with Professor Denis.
On his return to Paris, Štefánik at once drew attention to these difficulties, and emphasized the need for observing greater caution. He even took the view that it would be necessary to explain in La Nation Tchéque that we could not make common cause with the Jugoslav Committee in carrying out their policy. He reminded us that even the friends of the Jugoslavs in Rome, notably Barrère, Loiseau, and Giers, the Russian Ambassador, were unable always to approve of the radical tactics advocated by the Jugoslav Committee. This was the origin of a number of misunderstandings and even disagreements amongst us. To-day, especially after the Jugoslav endeavour to achieve an amicable agreement with Italy, there can be no harm in mentioning these matters.
On May 18, 1916, I was invited to call on M. Vesnić at the Serbian Legation. I had been discussing these topics with him for a long time, but this was the first occasion upon which he raised any objections to Štefánik’s policy. I then discussed matters with Denis to the same effect, explaining to him why and to what extent I was in agreement with Štefánik. We also considered the tactics of the Jugoslav Committee an unpractical one in certain respects, and detrimental to their own interests. I had heard various complaints on this score in Allied official circles. We took the view that between them and the Italians a compromise would have to be reached sooner or later, and that it would be dangerous not to prepare for it in good time, otherwise they would end by incurring a serious set-back by which they would probably lose more than if they agreed to a reasonable compromise involving some voluntary sacrifice on their part. On the other hand, I was bound to admit that Štefánik’s policy went too far, and that some of the Jugoslav complaints were well-founded.
In June a number of objections were raised to Štefánik’s policy by Trumbić, and again I had to admit that some of his remarks were justified. Štefánik, it should be said, believed that much would be accomplished as a result of the London Pact, and he arranged his tactics accordingly. He said that our duty was to save as much as possible for the Jugoslavs by means of a moderate attitude towards Italy, even if the Jugoslavs viewed the situation in a wrong light and occa-
