the Poles into an Allied camp and a camp of the Central Powers, by which they differed from us and the Jugoslavs, correspondingly characterized the Polish policy during the war, and exerted much influence upon our relations, especially as in the Allied countries many Poles were among the ranks of the pro-Austrians and pro-Magyars. These divergencies, however, were gradually modified by the events of the war, so that as our mutual interests ceased to be so diametrically opposed, a close relationship was established between us.
As a result of these divergencies of interest the official policy of our National Council did not, until the time of the Russian revolution, altogether harmonize with the Polish aims. What we then demanded was the unification of all the Polish regions of Russia, Austria, and Germany into a single State, with the widest possible measure of State autonomy under Russian suzerainty. We did not approve of the ambiguous policy of the Austrian-Poles, and we objected to the anti-Russian agitation which the Poles carried on in the Allied countries. It was our wish to be loyal to all the Allies, even though our attitude towards Tsarist Russia was a critical one. We therefore worked in favour of that maximum of the Polish claims which, before the outbreak of the Russian revolution, we regarded as compatible with the interests of all the Allies, as well as of the Poles themselves. In so doing we endeavoured to win the Poles over to our anti-Austrian attitude, and we managed to secure their support for agitation aiming at the destruction of Austria-Hungary. I never underrated the influence of the Poles, especially in this question. Among their émigrés there were many who sympathized with the movement for a separate peace with the Habsburg Empire, because they considered that only in this way would Germany be defeated and compelled to give up Posen and Silesia. On the other hand, they had no misgivings as to the future of Galicia, especially when they knew that the Emperor Karl was willing to let Poland have it in return for the protection of his monarchy. These Poles even regarded with sympathy the idea of a reduced Austria-Hungary, with which they thought that an independent Poland might be able to elaborate a political system, and thus better cope with both Russia and Germany. This was only a slightly different application of the Austrophile theory by which Vienna might counterbalance Berlin. Its advocates counted upon the assistance of the
