especially in America, was Paderewski, whom I did not meet until the Peace Conference.
My first meeting with Dmowski took place at Paris on May 18, 1916. I was immediately captivated by his shrewdness and the trenchant character of his political plans. He was well aware of our Russophile tendencies and at first he spoke guardedly, endeavouring to influence me by his moderation towards official Russia. At subsequent meetings, however, he became more and more radical, until he began an offensive against our line of policy by complaining of me and also of Masaryk, whose activities in London were, he alleged, not sufficiently favourable to the Poles.
I vindicated the tendency of our policy on the ground that we had to show consideration to the Allies and to Russia as well. At this period Dmowski was strongly opposed to the Allied policy, which in his opinion made too many concessions to Russia. He foretold and also desired the fall of Russia, and he himself told me that the day when the Russian revolution broke out was one of the happiest days in his life. He then began to advocate the theory that Russia was eliminated from European policy for another fifty years, and that France and the Allies must compensate themselves in Eastern Europe against Germany by means of a strong Poland. This theory met with much approval, and its prospects were further strengthened by the advent of Bolshevism. This policy, of which Dmowski was the foremost advocate, contributed largely to the subsequent advantageous position of Poland at the Peace Conference. Promoted by the further developments of European events, it rendered possible the later territorial extension of Poland, against which the Americans and particularly the English demurred for a long time at the Peace Conference.
It should be added that Dmowski had many opponents, particularly in London, where the chief of them was Mr. Lloyd George. This was due to his anti-Semitism, which he often exhibited rather ostentatiously, and his equally ostentatious nationalism. On the other hand, however, he understood better than the other Poles that in order to achieve the Polish aims it would be necessary to destroy Austria-Hungary, and in this respect he was always consistently on our side. We carried out a great deal of work jointly with the Poles during the war. From the spring of 1916, when I established official