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TRIUMPH OF POLICY OF SELF-DETERMINATION
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that no representative of Wilson could elucidate them further. He said that he would like to see the principles of the other side formulated with equal clarity. In particular he would like to know what was meant by a settlement of Balkan problems, how Karl proposed to deal with the disputes concerning the Adriatic coast and those with Italy, what he understood by the satisfaction of the national aspirations of the Slavonic people in Austria-Hungary, and how he would handle the question of the non-Turkish nationalities in Turkey. Wilson assumed that as regards Polish and Belgian affairs his views were identical with those of Karl. He further assured Karl that he desired knowledge on these points, not for any reasons of tactics, but because he really wished to go into these matters. He said that he was anxious to discover a rational settlement, and to promote the chances of a quick and genuinely lasting peace.

In the opinion of Alfonso and his ambassador, Wilson’s reply did not offer much ground for actual optimism, but it was nevertheless a good sign. Wilson, it appeared, had told the ambassador that he himself had typed out the whole of the reply in order that nobody could divulge the secret. An exchange of views conducted on these lines was not at variance with his opinions about public peace negotiations. If, however, the steps hitherto taken were to be changed into any form of explicit offer, Wilson would be obliged to inform the Allies about it immediately.

Karl and Czernin decided to reply to Wilson’s question through the same channels as before. As early as March 9th they notified King Alfonso of their intention, and made the preliminary arrangements for it. On March 23, 1918, the lengthy text of Karl’s reply left Vienna for Madrid, but the delivery of Karl’s message was delayed in Madrid through what appeared to have been partly technical difficulties and partly political obstacles. King Alfonso seems at this juncture to have had difficulties with Dato, his Prime Minister, who was afraid that Alfonso’s action would involve Spain in awkward consequences if the Allies got to hear of it.

In actual fact, as early as March 13th, the London newspapers reported that Karl was in touch with President Wilson. On the day before, the Matin had published a definite report from Switzerland stating that negotiations were proceeding between Karl and President Wilson. Even earlier than this,