Thomas, and Vandervelde. He was with the General Staff, and negotiated with the Ministers Lvov and Tereshchenko on the subject of our army. He put matters straight in the internal affairs of our organization. In America our people have accomplished a great deal of work. By means of collections they have made it possible for us to work successfully, and full recognition must be given to the enormous amount of work which they have done. With the Slovaks we are working in complete harmony.
The military situation is good on the whole. France is the weakest in this respect, and the English and Americans are our chief hopes. The sacrifices of the French are already considerable. They would therefore gladly accept a possible peace with Austria in order to terminate the war more quickly. Hence the danger of any compromise with Austria is greater than would appear. Only if you hold out and help us to show that Austria cannot be saved from collapse will they keep on until the end.
There are two more points which must be added:
The Slovak question will be solved favourably for us on the condition that you do not withdraw. Here the feeling is decidedly in favour of uniting us with the Slovaks in order to give us more power against the Germans. If you do not desert them, they here will not desert us.
A second question: If the Government should want to exploit the case of Dürich, remain completely calm. The dispute about Dürich will do no harm to our work and success. On the contrary, Dürich had to go because he had compromised himself completely with the old regime in Russia, and his departure strengthened our inner situation with regard to both French and Russian opinion, particularly the latter, because they objected to our connections with reactionary circles. So if the Government and the police should exploit this against us, you will know what view is to be taken of the matter.
I emphasize, then, these points: (1) No co-responsibility. (2) No coalition ministry. (3) Not to desert the Slovaks. (4) Not to negotiate with Austria for a compromise or to disavow us.
This report gives a good idea of our wishes, fears, and opinions at that time. It reached Prague somewhere about July 25th.
Here I should like to add something further with regard to our mutual news service between Prague and Paris. After the war I ascertained from my friends in Prague which of the reports actually reached them. Nearly all of them arrived safely. They were eagerly awaited, and their arrival caused much satisfaction. The receipt of most of them was notified to me during the war, just as we in Paris were able to confirm the receipt of news from Prague. From the summer of 1917 we again had a safe and uninterrupted connection by way of Switzerland and also Holland; from the spring of 1918 communications were carried on very quickly, so that as a rule
